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VARIATIONS ON SOME THEMES OF A "DISPORTING
GAZELLE" AND HIS FRIEND: STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION AS SEEN BY JEROME FRANK
AND FELIX FRANKFURTER
Kent Greenawalt*
In 1947, this Review published two lectures on statutory interpretation
by Jerome Frank and Felix Frankfurter. Both jurists were concerned with a
basic question: How constrained are judges when they interpret legislation?
The answers each gives, while similar in some respects, differ strikingly. In
arguing that interpretation necessarily involves a creative element, Frank
analogizes the role of a judge in interpreting legislation to that of a performer
in interpreting a musical composition. Although he argues that judicial creativity is constrained, Frank views statutory interpretation as "a kind of
legislation." ForFrankfurter, by contrast, in construing a statute, a judge is
to disinterestedly carry out the purposes of the legislature. Judicial legislation
oversteps the function of the courts. In this Essay, Professor Greenawalt examines these competing paradigms by contrasting them not only with each
other, but also with certain illuminating opinions written by Frank and
Frankfurter. While the opinions help to point out the limitations of each
theory, Professor Greenawalt argues that the Frank and Frankfurter's accounts remain important voices in the contemporary debates about statutory

interpretation.
INTRODUCTION

Statutory interpretation inevitabIy involves many elements. Theories
of statutory interpretation offer accounts of the important elements and
place them within a coherent whole.' Part of the puzzle of statutory interpretation is how recipients should understand instructions that are
cast as rules and are formulated in natural language. But anyone who
studies this subject quickly realizes that one cannot come up with some
grand theory for all human instructions, and simply apply that theory to
law. 2 What is crucial for statutory interpretation is the nature of law that
is backed by the coercive power of the state, and the relationships be* University Professor, Columbia Law School; Editor-in-Chief, Columbia Law Review
(1962-1963). I am very grateful to John Manning for his thoughtful suggestions, to
Michael Dowdle for his excellent research assistance, and to Lewis Yelin and other
members of the Law Review for their significant contribution in developing themes of the
Essay and in editing its content.
1. In Statutory Interpretation: Twenty Questions (I999), I attempt to provide such a
comprehensive account, although with much less than a complete theory.
2. I believe, however, that analysis of nonlegal instructions can illuminate issues about
interpreting statutes. See Kent Greenawalt, From The Bottom Up, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 994
(1997). David Lyons, in conversation, has reminded me that typical legal rules are not
formulated as instructions and has urged that they should not be so understood. I
continue to believe that legal rules can well be understood as kinds of instructions, but I do
not develop the argument here, since no important conclusions depend on it.
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tween legislatures, executive agencies, and courts. Just how judges should
interpret statutes depends greatly on how legislatures, agencies, and
courts function; relations among these bodies may vary in different legal
cultures or in one legal culture over time.
Within the United States, the centerpiece of theorizing about courts
and legislatures has always been constitutional law. When, and why, are
judges justified in relying on written constitutional provisions to strike
down measures adopted by elected legislatures? The stark power of judicial review, the vague contours and ancient lineage of many important
constitutional provisions, and the values of decent government and individual rights that constitutions reflect, have proved an irresistible attraction for scholars and judges reflecting on the place of courts. But statutory interpretation presents its own fascinating set of issues about how
courts interpret binding, authoritative language. This Essay views some
of those issues through the lens of two mid-century articles.
The 1947 Columbia Law Review published two lectures by distinguished judges about statutory interpretation. Felix Frankfurter had developed courses in statutory interpretation at Harvard Law School, and
he interpreted statutes during nearly a quarter century on the Supreme
Court. Henry J. Friendly wrote in 1964 that Frankfurter "fashioned a
corpus of opinions on the reading of statutes that has not been matched
in our time and does not seem likely to be in the future."3 Frankfurter's
"Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes" provides a balanced account of statutory construction from a time when Supreme Court Justices
were comparatively undivided about how to perform that task. 4 Jerome
Frank was a leading legal theorist and Court of Appeals judge. His
"Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation," draws
out implications of an arresting analogy between musical performance
and statutory construction. 5 Both lectures move between reflections on
what judges do to theoretical observations. Both focus on the extent to
which judges are constrained not to rely on their own moral and political
judgments.
The lectures differ in tone and substance. Frankfurter writes in an
instructional or professorial vein, based partly on research (by himself
and his law clerk) into hundreds of opinions.6 He avoids excess and
evinces confidence in the detachment and objectivity of judges. Frank
aims to engage the reader with his intriguing comparison, emphasizing
3. HenryJ. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, reprinted in
Benchmarks 196, 233 (1967). Friendly was a brilliant successor of Jerome Frank on the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
4. 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527 (1947). The oral lecture had been delivered on March 18,
1947, as a Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture to the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York.
5. 47 Colum. L. Rev. 1259 (1947). This paper was an expansion of his April 25 afterdinner talk for the Columbia Law Review.
6. My colleague, Louis Henkin, then Justice Frankfurter's clerk, did much of the
review of opinions.
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the creativity and subjectivity ofjudging. A reader of the two pieces may
miss how much they share. Both reject the idea that, in difficult cases,
the main effort ofjudges should be to discern the precise linguistic significance of the provision whose meaning is contested. Both reject the idea
that statutory interpretation comes down to a refined assessment of how
legislators intended to deal with the exact problem that the court faces.
Both claim that judges should be gnided by the broad purposes of the
legislature.
The lectures represent different strands of thought that contributed
to the rise of the "legal process" approach to statutory interpretation in
the 1950s and 1960s,7 an approach that once dominated thought about
the subject and continues to have many adherents. Building upon Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., 8 legal realists challenged formalist understandings
of law, urged that law was social policy, and stressed the indeterminacy of
legal results. Frank was a leading legal realist. He was the most prominent fact skeptic, claiming that the primary ingredient of uncertainty in
law is the unreliability of factual determinations. 9 Although the main
body of his lecture is not a straightforward presentation of legal realist
claims,1 0 its focus on the creativity of judges bears a realist imprint.
Frankfurter was a more direct forebear of legal process thinking. In
courses he taught during the 1920s and 1930s, he developed conceptions
of institutional competence and of the desirability of courts deferring to
legislatures and to expert administrative agencies. He taught Henry Hart
and others at Harvard who then became proponents of a legal process
approach to statutory meaning. In his lecture, Frankfurter adopts a coop-

erative view of how legislators and courts may work together. According
to William Eskridge and Philip Frickey, "the contention that statutes
should be interpreted equitably and purposively achieved near unanimous acceptance in the law review literature written between 1938 and
1941."11 This central tenet of legal process theory receives ringing endorsement by Frankfurter.

7. This approach was most fully manifested by Henry Hart and Albert Sack's
posthumously published materials. See generally Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks,
The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) [hereinafter Hart & Sacks]. The editors of The
Legal Process develop the intellectual background from which "legal process" work
emerged. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Publication Editors' Preface, in
Hart & Sacks, supra, at xi, xi-xiii; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, An
Historical and Critical Introduction to The Legal Process, in Hart & Sacks, supra, at li, li-lxvii
[hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction].
8. The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897), is the best summary of Holmes's
jurisprudential views.
9. See especially Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial (1949).
10. In a brief coda, Frank offers the central thesis of fact skepticism for which he is
best known. See Frank, supra note 5, at 1272-78.
11. Eskridge and Frickey, Introduction, supra note 7, at lxvii, with citations.
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When analyzing two lectures on the same topic, the reader is naturally drawn to compare their ideas. But here another comparison may be
even more illuminating. Both Frankfurter and Frank were serious intellectuals and very influential practitioners of the art they discuss. A look at
their performance as judges can provide insight into the ideas in their
off-the-bench writings and some test of whether those ideas warrant adoption. Federal judges, of course, decide many statutory cases each year. A
genuinely fair comparison of this sort would require analysis of a broad
range of cases.' 2 I settle for a much more selective exercise, considering
in depth one highly unusual case in which Judge Frank participated,
treating more summarily an important statutory dissent of Justice Frankfurter's and a constitutional opinion that exemplifies his confidence in
judicial detachment, and discussing briefly two cases in which our two
authors both wrote opinions and disagreed about statutory meaning.
Neither lecture is systematic or seriously defends its positions against
possible competitors. But the lectures hold more than historical interest.
They raise questions about statutory interpretation that remain very
much with us, and they stake out positions that, in their broad outlines,
remain highly plausible. Although these positions now have powerful
challengers, my own view is that the purposive approaches that Frank-

furter and Frank defend better capture the appropriate role of courts
than do any radically different alternatives. That does not mean I agree
with every detail of what either author says, and I shall indicate my most
serious reservations.
1.

PERSPECTIVES ON

OUR

AUTHORS

For readers of my generation and older, the names of Frankfurter
and Frank-towering figures in mid-century American law-will be familiar, but younger readers may have less sense of their place in the American legal establishment at the time they wrote. Even readers for whom
these are (or were) household names may be unaware of ways in which
their careers intertwined. One need not possess any neat thesis about
how personal background affects ideas to believe that practical experience and character may help explain intellectual stances.
Frankfurter came to New York in 1894 from Vienna as a twelve-year-

old.1 3 At Harvard Law School, he accepted John Chipman Gray's skeptical ideas about legal doctrine' 4 and James Bradley Thayer's thesis that
judges should exercise restraint in constitutional cases, not overturning
legislative choices unless these are clearly unconstitutional.1 5 He worked
in both the Taft and Wilson administrations, went to Harvard as a profes12. Friendly, supra note 3, passim, provides a relatively full account of Frankfurter's
performance in statutory cases.
13. See Melvin I. Urofsky, Felix Frankfurter 2 (1991).
14. See id. at 2.
15. See H.N. Hirsh, The Enigma of Felix Frankfurter 128 (1981).
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sor,1 6 reentered the government during World War 1,17 and returned to
Harvard.18
In his days at Harvard, Frankfurter pioneered the teaching of statutory subjects.1 9 He remained involved in liberal political causes, receiving
occasional financial support from Justice Louis Brandeis, who called him
"the most useful lawyer in the United States." 20 With the coming of the
New Deal, Frankfurter declined any formal position, but became a very
close advisor to President Roosevelt. In 1939, when he was appointed to
replace Benjamin Nathan Cardozo on the Supreme Court, Harold Ickes
said the nomination was "the most significant and worth-while thing the
President has done" (this more than six years into the Roosevelt Administration).21 In praise more directly on the topic of statutory construction,
Judge Friendly said years later, "No judge before him ... arrived at the
task of statutory construction so well prepared. His whole legal life had
been lived with statutes." 22 The widespread expectation that Frankfurter
would become the Court's leader was never fulfilled, however. By 1947the date of our lecture-it was evident that most of the other Justices
were not willing to follow his lead; but the bitterness of finding himself
consistently out-of-step with a liberal majority in constitutional cases still
lay ahead.
After graduating from the University of Chicago Law School in 1912,
Jerome Frank became a leading expert on corporate reorganization in
Chicago and then New York. 23 In 1930, he published Law and the Modern
Mind, a striking realist and Freudian account of legal decisionmaking
that suggests that the major ingredient ofjudicial decision is the judge's
personality. With Frankfurter's help, Frank became General Counsel to
the Agricultural Administration Agency 24 and then served with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Securities and Exchange Com16. See id. at 40-41. There he expected to maintain an active involvement in public
issues.
17. He was secretary and counsel to the President's Mediation Commission, which was
designed to control strikes in industries vital to the war effort. See id. at 55. The
Commission investigated both the massive deportation of striking miners from Bisbee,
Arizona, and the trial of Tom Mooney, a labor organizer convicted of planting a bomb that
killed several people. His work in highly controversial circumstances showed a deep
concern for fair process and won him an undeserved reputation as a radical. See id. at

55-57.
18. See id. at 65.
19. See Friendly, supra note 3, at 198.
20. Urofsky, supra note 13, at 20, 25-28. Frankfurter's best known activity was his
intense unsuccessful effort to gain a new trial for Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti,
anarchists convicted of killing two payroll guards. See id. at 22-24.
21. Id. at ix.
22. Friendly, supra note 3, at 197.
23. See RobertJerome Glennon, The Iconoclast as Reformer: Jerome Frank's Impact
on American Law 19-21 (1985).
24. See id. at 25.
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mission. In 1941, Roosevelt appointed him to the Second Circuit, where
he served with an extraordinary group of judges.2 5
Frankfurter and Frank exchanged hundreds of letters. Both were
political liherals who rejected the conceptual jurisprudence of the conservative members of the Supreme Court in favor of a more pragmatic
understanding of the relation of legal doctrine to social consequences.
Both regarded judging as an art, and hoth greatly admired Learned
Hand. 26 Both were warm and charming in personal relations, devoted
and loyal friends, but each also had a regrettable tendency to personalize
disagreements. 27 According to a biographer, Frankfurter "took the refusal of his colleagues to follow his lead as a personal affront and unfortunately allowed full play to his considerable talent for invective."28 Frank,
a biographer has said, "bruised easily"; the "mildest chiding hurt him"; he
was "extremely stubborn and unyielding in debate," and "his writing cut
and stung, caricatured and satirized." 29 Frankfurter once wrote to Frank,
"Every time I have a brush with you I feel like a brute who has hurt a
charmingly disporting gazelle." 30
Frankfurter differed from Frank in his nearly thorough acceptance
of judicial restraint on constitutional issues,31 and, more relevant for our
purposes, in his confidence that judges engaged in "process jurisprudence" could be disinterested. The two had different views about judicial
opinions as well: Frankfurter used complex and embroidered language;
Frank favored a more direct style. 32 These stylistic propensities exhibit
themselves in the two lectures.
25. These included Learned and Augustus Hand, as well as two former Yale Law
School deans, Thomas Swan and Charles Clark. See id. at 103-04.
26. Frank called him "our wisest judge" in a book dedication, Frank, supra note 9, at
v, and Frankfurter strongly urged his appointment to the Supreme Court, see Hirsh, supra
note 15, at 162.
27. Frankfurter was adept at relations with mentors, whom he flattered, and with
students and law clerks, whom he instructed. He proved less able at dealing with peers on
the Supreme Court, whom he often antagonized by instructing them more than they
wished. Soon after arriving on the bench, Frankfurter wrote to Justice Hugo Black,
explaining to that former politician that judges
cannot escape the responsibility of filling in gaps which the finitudes of even the
most imaginative legislation render inevitable. . .. They cannot decide things by
invoking a new major premise out of whole cloth; they must make the law that
they do make out of the existing materials with due deference to the
presuppositions of the legal system of which they have been made a part.
Urofsky, supra note 13, at 46.

28. Id. at 47.
29. Glennon, supra note 23, at 23-24.

30. Id. at 24.
31. The Supreme Court Justice to whom Frank felt closest was William O. Douglas,
among the most activist Justices in civil rights and civil liberties cases. See id. at 118-19.
32. Frank wrote an anonymous essay in a law review criticizing Benjamin Cardozo's
writing as not reflective of American speech. See Anon Y. Mous, The Speech of Judges: A
Dissenting Opinion, 29 Va. L. Rev. 625 (1943). Calling "lucidity ...
the basic quality of
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II. WORDS AND MuSic

Because Frank's lecture, unlike Frankfurter's, has a tantalizing single
theme to analyze, and because the case of Frank's on which I concentrate
is so compelling, I begin with those.
If the December issue was published on time, 33 Frank's essay appeared within days of the Second Circuit's decision of a troubling naturalization case, Repouille v. United States. 34 Judge Frank, and his colleagues
Learned Hand and Augustus Hand, had to apply the statutory phrase
"good moral character" to decide if an alien resident should be granted
citizenship. Learned Hand, writing the court's opinion, took community
sentiments as the standard of "good moral character." Frank dissented,
arguing that courts should look to ethical leaders or at least acquire solid
factual information about community attitudes. Repouille starkly poses
the question of how judges are to make moral assessments when they
apply statutory law. The statutory standard of "good moral character" is,
of course, atypical; but the case nonetheless provides a striking mirror for
Frank's lecture. The lecture concerns judicial creativity and the case well
reveals both Frank's willingness to undertake imaginative interpretation
and his practical sense of constraint.
A. The Lecture

The heart of "Words and Music" is a comparison between a performer's interpretation of a piece of music and ajudge's interpretation of
legislation. 35 Frank claims that the comparison yields insights beyond
good judicial opinions," he complained that Cardozo's opinions often obscured analysis.
See id. at 104.
Frank's papers contain an unpublished parody of Frankfurter's style of writing that
shows Frank did not find it congenial:
Mr. Justice Frankfurterdelivered the opinion of the Court.
A semi-centennial, three decades and seven winter solstices preceding the
present, our paternal progenitors gestated and regurgitated upon the western
hemisphere (49* longitude 38* latitude) a pristine commonwealth, political,
social, and economic, of our glorious and heterogeneous population proclaiming
the universal hypothesis, proposition and thesis, that all male issue are politically
and economically liberated and equal, pari-passu per capita and not per stirpes.
Glennon, supra note 23, at 203 n.103.
Frankfurter, in turn, was less than enamored with Frank's style of opinions. Frank
sometimes used opinions to write essays about matters not closely related to the precise
legal issue in the case at hand. See id. at 104. After receiving a letter from Frank
explaining his view that opinions should educate, Frankfurterresponded, that there "is no
reason why you should take a simple case which Holmes would have disposed of in a page
and a half and use it as a peg for an essay on mercantilism." Id. at 105; see also id. at 87-89
(exchange between the two on Frank's legal arguments as a New Deal lawyer).
33. 1 understand this was a big "if" for many years of the Law Review's history.
34. 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947).
35. Frank mentions two other papers containing similar comparisons, and proceeds
to say, "I want, therefore, to assert my claim to priority." Frank, supra note 5, at 1260 n.9.
One wonders why he sees his rightful claim as to priority. Granting that Frank thought of
the comparison before he read the other papers, their writers presumably thought of the
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those inherent in the more common idea that statutory interpretation is
an art rather than a science, and defends the analogy to music against
competing analogies such as architecture.36
Frank draws heavily on the work of Ernst Krenek, "a brilliant modern
musical composer," who "criticizes those musical 'purists' who insist on
what they call 'work-fidelity."' 37 According to Krenek, performers who
try very hard to do everything just as the composer intended, fail to do
justice to a work's spirit. They end up producing "'an unbearable caricature of the composition.' 38 Instead, a performer should aim to capture
the spirit of a work as filtered through "'the medium of [his] personal
life.'"39 The result is that different performers will perform scores somewhat differently. This does not mean any one performance will necessarily be better or worse than another, because variant interpretations may
be "'equally good . . . and satisfactory.'"40
We can reduce Frank's account of Krenek's analysis to the following
propositions: (1) Composers cannot completely control musical interpretation; the characteristics of performers will influence performance;
(2) attempts by performers to stick too doggedly to every aspect of a composer's design produce inferior performances; (3) performers are constrained to a considerable degree by what the composer has written, but
they are well advised to reflect a composer's essential objectives rather
than replicate each detail of how the composer conceived of his work's
comparison before they presented it. Since they presented it before Frank and may have
conceived it before Frank, the issue for Frank is not really one of priority, but rather of his
originality.
36. See id. at 1259-60. Frank's attraction to the musical analogy almost certainly
derived from his personal background: His mother was an accomplished musician who
raised her son on music. See Glennon, supra note 23, at 15. The legal academy's recent
fascination with literary interpretation and its comparative disinterest in religious
interpretation shows that scholars tend to choose fields as fruitfully analogous to law more
because of their own interest in those fields than because the analogies are uniquely
apposite. Whether Frank is right that personal background is as central for judging as he
asserts in Law and the Modern Mind, personal interest substantially affects lines of
scholarship generally, and the analogies that legal scholars choose for law more
particularly.
We, the readers, may learn from analogies without fretting about just why they
appealed to their authors and without trying to settle which analogies are really closest to
legal interpretation. But in an illuminating essay, Sanford Levinson and J.M. Balkin
emphasize a way in which musical performance does resemble legal interpretation more
than does literary interpretation. The composer can be understood as issuing a set of
"commands" about performance, analogous to "commands" that legislators and
constitution-makers issue to judges. Sanford Levinson & J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and
Other Performing Arts, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1597, 1606-09 (1991).
37. Frank, supra note 5, at 1260 (quoting Ernst Krenek, uncited work).
38. Id. at 1261 (quoting Ernst Krenek, uncited work). Wagner was so disappointed
with interpreters who tried to follow his metronomic markings too faithfully, that he
decided to dispense with such markings. Id.
39. Id. (quoting Ernst Krenek, uncited work).
40. Id. (quoting Ernst Krenek, uncited work) (alteration in original).
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being played; 4 1 and (4) the most wholesome outcome is different interpreters playing the same piece of music differently, importing something
of their own feelings into their performances.
Before we turn to what Judge Frank says directly about statutory interpretation, it is worth asking how these propositions might relate to law.
Proposition (1) concerning the inevitable effect of interpreters' personal
characteristics is indisputably applicable in some circumstances. Interpreters cannot wholly escape their own special characters when they try to
discern the meaning of what others have said. When meaning is straightforward in context, vastly different readers arrive at the same understanding. But when meaning becomes debatable, an interpreter's personality
may influence judgment. 42 Proposition (2), about the undesirability of
dogged reproduction of detail, and Proposition (3), about the desirability
of interpretation that aims at essential objectives, are more controversial
as applied to law. According to these propositions, judges should not
stick slavishly to every literal aspect of statutory language; they should be
guided by the spirit of a text. Proposition (4)'s welcome of a variety of
performances is by far the most disquieting for an orthodox view of law; if
this claim were true about law, wise interpreters would not "fight" the
subjectivity of their own inclinations, but would give these inclinations
relatively free rein.
In moving from musical performance to statutory interpretation,
Frank says that judges should interpret a piece of legislation literally
sometimes, but that often "so to construe a statute will yield a grotesque
caricature of the legislature's purpose." 4 3 Judges should cooperate with a
legislature by using "their imagination in trying to get at and apply what a
legislature really meant, but imperfectly said .. . ."44 Judges should dis41. Frank does not concern himself, nor need we, with how much study performers
should devote to the background of works or with exactly what aspects of musical
interpretation are best left free and what aspects are best resolved for all performers by the
composer. Many classical composers leave space for cadenzas that performers develop; but
should performers regard themselves as free to alter rhythms the composer has noted or to
deviate from the actual notes composers have written, if the spirit moves them or if they
think some other notes are obviously superior? (Levinson and Balkin discuss the propriety
of playing a note that Beethoven prohably would have written had pianos of his time heen
capable of playing it. See Levinson & Balkin, supra note 36, at 1598-99.) is there any limit
on how far the performer's musical instrument should vary from that for which the
composer wrote? We can leave these questions for musical critics and audiences; reviewing
a book of essays entitled Authenticity and Early Music (N. Kenyon ed., 1988), Levinson and
Balkin tell us just how controversial these issues have hecome. See Levinson & Balkin,
supra note 36. Analogous questions about legal standards are of crucial significance for
statutory interpretation. When those who make rules have not delegated subsequent
judgment to interpreters by design, how far should interpreters draw on their own
intuitions and values to resolve debatable issues?
42. A performer's personal character may always influence musical performance to
some degree; that may not be true of all "either-or" interpretive judgments in law, though
the quality of any written opinion reflects its author.
43. Frank, supra note 5, at 1262.
44. Id. at 1263.
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cover meaning in all parts of a statute, not a single provision. 45 Frank

approvingly quotes one of Holmes's aphorisms, that statutory meaning is
"to be felt rather than proved." 4 6
According to Frank, differences in legal interpretation are no more
avoidable than differences in musical performance. 47 Interpretation is
"inescapably a kind of legislation." 48 Judicial creativity should be limited,
"but, within proper limits, it is a boon not an evil." 49 Were courts to honestly acknowledge their creative power, that might "well induce restraint
in exercising it." 50

Frank is much more specific about the restraints on judges than
about those on musical performers. If the legislature makes plain that it
wants literal interpretation, judges should follow that lead. 5 1 More generally, when the legislature employs relatively precise terms, judges have
much less room for creativity than when a statute contains a vague and
flexible standard.5 2 Because the legislature has the power to declare policy, judges should adhere to its will about that,53 eliminating their personal views of policy as far as possible. 54 When they make assessments of
value, judges should rely on the community's sense of values. 55 According to Frank, the responsibility of lower courts differs from that of the
highest courts; the duty of an intermediate federal appellate court "is usually to learn, 'not the congressional intent, but the Supreme Court's

intent.' "56
Finally, Frank tackles the uncertainties of fact-finding. Fallible, subjective reactions of witnesses and of juries or trial judges render factual
determinations unreliable. Frank ties this topic to what precedes it by
talking of factual judgments as involving creativity beyond that of a musi45. See id. at 1267 (referring to Gestalt psychology).
46. Id. at 1265 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 496 (1911)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
47. See id. at 1267.
48. Id. at 1269. Frank quotes Bishop Hoadly's famous utterance, so favored by John
Chipman Gray, "[W]hoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any ... laws, it is he
who is truly the Law Giver." Id. at 1264 (quoting Benjamin Hoadly, uncited work)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
49. Id. at 1264.
50. Id. at 1271.
51. See id. at 1267. Interestingly, Frank says musical composers can give similar
directions, and he describes Stravinsky as an example of a composer who "asked his
interpreters to be wholly unimaginative." Id. Stravinksy's approach is more fully explained
in Levinson & Balkin, supra note 36, at 1641-43.
52. See Frank, supra note 5, at 1259, 1263, 1266. When the legislature leaves courts
"the job of applying broad vague standards," it "'has delegated to the courts the duty of
fixing the standard for each case.'" Id. at 1266 (quoting United States v. Associated Press,

52 F. Supp. 362, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (Learned Hand, J.)).
53. See id. at 1263-64.
54.
55.
56.
Tax, 35

See id. at 1265.
See id. at 1267.
Id. at 1271 (quoting Stanley S. Surrey, The Supreme Court and Federal Income
U. Ill. L. Rev. 779, 808 (1948)).
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cal performer, 57 a kind of legislative power. 58 However, if he is being
candid, he does not believe that this function offers an appropriate opportunity for flexible judgment, since he thinks judges should try to find
facts as accurately as possible. 59
The constraints that Frank sketches on judicial creativity leave doubt

as to whether he embraces one aspect of the musical analogy, namely
Proposition (4), that it is actually desirable that different judges reach
different interpretations. If different interpretations are inevitable, one
might initially think that desirability is beside the point-we don't worry

too much about whether salt water is desirable-but lurking in the background is a critical question about how a judge understands her task. I
return to this question after discussing Frank's position in Repouille.
B. The Decision

Repouille was denied citizenship because he had deliberately killed
one of his children. Under the Nationality Act, an applicant for citizen-

ship had to show himself to have been a person of "good moral character" for the five years preceding the filing of his petition. 60 Repouille had
killed his son approximately four years and ten months before applying,
under circumstances described thus by Learned Hand:
[H]e had deliberately put to death his son, a boy of thirteen, by
means of chloroform. His reason for this tragic deed was that
the child had "suffered from birth from a brain injury which
destined him to be an idiot and a physical monstrosity mal57. See id. at 1272.
58. See id. at 1273-74.
59. I was a bit surprised to find here a passage that struck me when I read Frank's
Courts on Trial, supra note 9, and to learn that the story it tells had already appeared in
another book. The passage concerns a judge who decided legal issues favorably for the
plaintiff, but then ruled for the defendant on the facts. The judge later told Frank, one of
the defendant's lawyers,
"'[t] he plaintiff was urging a rule of law which you thought was wrong. I thought
it was legally right but very unjust. So I decided to lick him on the facts. And by
giving him every break on law points during the trial, I made it impossible for him
to reverse me on appeal, because I knew the upper courts would never upset my
findings of fact.' That judicial conduct was not commendable."
Id. at 1275 (quoting Jerome Frank, If Men Were Angels 98-99 (1942)).
Frank does not discuss exactly why the "judicial conduct was not commendable." If
jury nullification is an accepted part of our system, is there no room forjudge nullification,
or is judge nullification unforgivable in the manner that a performer's blatant disregard of
a composer's musical notes might be indefensible? I am not sure whether Frank's
comment here represents his full view or is a caution that he, an appellate judge, is hardly
advocating wanton disregard of law by other judges. The troubling issue of outright
judicial nullification of legal standards accomplished by intentional misfinding of facts is
peripheral to the main themes of "Words and Music," and I do not discuss it further here.
See generally Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality 359-68 (1987) (discussing
the problems raised by the power of a judge or jury to nullify substantive law).
60. Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152, 153 (2d Cir. 1947) (citing 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 707(a)(3)).
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formed in all four limbs. The child was blind, mute, and deformed. He had to be fed; the movements of his bladder and
bowels were involuntary, and his entire life was spent in a small

crib." Repouille had four other children at the time towards
whom he has always been a dutiful and responsible parent; it
may be assumed that his act was to help him in their nurture,
which was being compromised by the burden imposed upon
him in the care of the fifth. The family was altogether dependent upon his industry for its support.61
At Repouille's criminal trial for manslaughter in the first degree, the
jury convicted him of manslaughter in the second degree and recommended the utmost clemency. The judge gave him a suspended
sentence. 6 2

Hand took the jury's action as showing that it "did not feel any moral
repulsion at [the] crime" and "wished to exculpate the offender." 6 3
Hand said,
[W]e all know that there are great numbers of people of the
most unimpeachable virtue, who think it morally justifiable to
put an end to a life so inexorably destined to be a burden to
others, and-so far as any possible interest of its own is concerned-condemned to a brutish existence, lower indeed than
all but the lowest forms of sentient life. 64
Nonetheless, noting a Massachusetts case in which a similar act brought a
life sentence, Hand concluded, "we feel reasonably secure in holding that
only a minority of virtuous persons would deem the practice morally justifiable, while it remains in private hands, even when the provocation is as
overwhelming as it was in this instance." 65

Here is much of Frank's dissent:
The district judge found that Repouille was a person of
"good moral character." . . . My colleagues, although their

sources of information concerning the pertinent mores are not
shown to be superior to those of the district judge, reject his
finding. And they do so, too, while conceding that their own
conclusion is uncertain, and (as they put it) "tentative." 1 incline to think that the correct statutory test (the test Congress
intended) is the attitude of our ethical leaders. That attitude
would not be too difficult to learn . . .. But the precedents in
this circuit constrain us to be guided by contemporary public
opinion about which, cloistered as judges are, we have but vague
notions. (One recalls Gibbon's remark that usually a person
who talks of "the opinion of the world at large" is really referring
to "the few people with whom 1 happened to converse.")
61. Id. at 152-53.
62. See id. at 153.
63. Id.
64. Id. Court memoranda indicate that Learned Hand was originally inclined to
admit Repouille to citizenship. See Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand 633 (1994).
65. Repouille, 165 F.2d at 153.
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Seeking to apply a standard of this type, courts usually do
not rely on evidence but utilize what is often called the doctrine
of "judicial notice," which, in matters of this sort, properly permits informal inquiries by the judges. However, for such a purpose (as in the discharge of many other judicial duties), the
courts are inadequately staffed, so that sometimes 'judicial notice" actually means judicial ignorance.
But the courts are not utterly helpless; such judicial impotence has its limits. ... I see no good reason why a man's rights
should be jeopardized by judges' needless lack of knowledge.
I think, therefore, that, in any case such as this, where we
lack the means of determining present-day public reactions, we
should remand to the district judge with these directions: The
judge should give the petitioner and the government the opportunity to bring to the judge's attention reliable information on
the subject, which he may supplement in any appropriate way.
All the data so obtained should be put of record. On the basis
thereof, the judge should reconsider his decision and arrive at a
conclusion. Then, if there is another appeal, we can avoid sheer
guessing, which alone is now available to us, and can reach
something like an informed judgment.66
Because Frank accepts many of Hand's formulations of the relevant
standards for decision, we need to explore some puzzling nuances in
Hand's opinion before attending to Frank's objections. Drawing from an
earlier case, 67 Hand said that the statutory test is "whether 'the moral
feelings, now prevalent generally in this country' would 'be outraged' by
the conduct in question: that is, whether it conformed to 'the generally
accepted moral conventions current at the time.'"68 Despite its sensitivity
and appealing incertitude, the opinion bulldozes subtleties of moral judgment and feeling. "Character" differs from the morality of single acts,
and "outrage" is not the same as judgments of moral unjustifiability.
The statutory requirement for citizenship is "good moral character,"
yet Hand and Frank treat as decisive the quality of one central act. A
person might have a good moral character, although he committed one
seriously immoral act nearly five years ago. 69 Perhaps Hand and Frank
did not think immigration officials were equipped to make a serious evaluation of the whole character of applicants, but neither offers that
explanation.
In concentrating on single acts, Hand equates (1) whether an act
fails to conform to "accepted moral conventions" with (2) whether an act
66. Id. at 154-55 (Frank, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
67. In United States v. Francioso, 164 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1947), Hand had written that
a man who had illegally married a niece did not lack good moral character in remaining
with her and their four children. See id. at 164.
68. Repouille, 165 F.2d at 153 (quoting Francioso, 164 F.2d at 163).
69. No doubt, some acts are so vicious that we would be unlikely to say that someone
who commits them has a good character, but that is not obviously true about Repouille's
act.
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"outrages" prevalent feelings. But the two standards are far from symmetrical in coverage. A man suffering a painful terminal illness who is too
incapacitated to take his own life begs his daughter to help him die; after
much agonizing, she does so. What is the community's attitude? Some
people think such aid is deeply wrong morally, others believe it is justified, while many others are perplexed about what is right or acceptable to
do. One might find that only "a minority of virtuous persons" deem the
act morally justifiable (what Hand says about Repouille's act) but also
that only a minority definitely regard it as morally unjustifiable.
The more important problem about Hand's equating of outrage and
nonconformity with moral conventions concerns the people who do consider an act to be morally unjustifiable. Someone might regard all euthanasia as seriously unjustifiable, yet acknowledge that others disagree and
that any adult child faced with this plea from a loved parent would feel a
powerful pull to help. Told what had happened, this outsider, and many
others, might conclude that the daughter had acted wrongly but not feel
outrage. 70 According to community sentiments, an act might be seriously
unjustifiable, but not outrageous. Hand finally phrases his judgment in
terms of attitudes about moral justifiability; but an inquiry about likely
71
"outrage" better captures the concern about moral character.
Without separately addressing what the exact standard of moral judgment should be, Frank proposes two ways to apply that standard other
than by intuitive judicial discernment. His main expressed worry is that
Hand's approach gives judges too much discretion, since judges intuiting
community sentiments will have little rein on their own sentiments.
Frank's preferred solution-to rely on ethical experts-may in part be a
means to move to a more enlightened morality, but it is mainly a way to
restrain judicial discretion. 72 Frank's alternative suggestion, that judges
70. The outsider might say, "she committed a serious moral wrong, but many people
of good moral character would do the same." If one outsider might have this attitude, so
might many members of the community. Because of such nuances in various moral
attitudes, I think Hand's conclusion that the jury wished to exculpate Repouille is too
simple. The jury did not acquit outright. The actual conviction may have represented a
compromise. Whether or not it did, most jurors may have thought Repouille had
committed a serious moral wrong, but was nonetheless more to be pitied than condemned.
They may also have been moved by the need of his family for "his industry." Repouile, 165
F.2d at 153.
71. If people feel moral outrage at an action, they usually do not think persons of
good moral character will commit it.
72. In our postmodern, fractured culture, it is hard to imagine who would generally
be regarded as moral experts; Frank's proposal seems to founder on this difficulty, if not
others. Correspondence between Learned Hand and Justice Frankfurter reveals that they
were markedly less sanguine than Frank about what this approach might accomplish.
Hand wrote to Frankfurter on December 9:
I assume that he expected the districtjudge, sua sponte [on his own initiative], to
call the Cardinal, Bishop Gilber, an orthodox and a liberal Rabbi, [Protestant
theologian] Reinhold Niebuhr, the head of the Ethical Cultural Society, and
[literary critic] Edmund Wilson; have them all cross-examined: ending in a
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acquire factual evidence about community morality, clearly represents an
effort to supplant intuition with social science in the interests of curbing
discretion and inducing sound judgment. 73 Frank's main thrust is that

judges should not be left at sea as they are under the Hand approach. 74
C. The Lecture in Light of the Decision: Critique

Frank's Repouille dissent tells us a good deal about his attitude as a
judge to some of the themes of his lecture, and the case's troubling issues
help us to sift the wheat from the chaff in Frank's off-the-bench remarks.
I shall first discuss Frank's expressed view that appellate judges should
predict Supreme Court resolutions, before turning to the most subjectivist potentialities of the musical analogy and the bounded creativity of
judges.
1. Intermediate Appellate Courts. - Frank's lecture suggests that the
duty of intermediate federal courts is to learn "the Supreme Court's intent." Frank does not recognize that this wrinkle either makes the musical analogy inapplicable for most judges or makes the analogy much
more complex than Frank presents. One would need to think of an original composer (the legislature) and an original interpreter/secondary
composer (the highest court), with the lower court judges aiming to be
more faithful to the secondary composer than to the original composer,
if they perceive a difference. If lower court judges could predict the attitudes of the highest court, they would have a duty to follow its likely response to a statute even before it has interpreted the statute.
Frank's dissent in Repouille casts strong doubt on the rigor with which
he followed this prescription. He says nothing to indicate that Supreme
"survey." Oh, Jesus! I don't know how we ought to deal with such cases except by
the best guess we have.
Gunther, supra note 64, at 631-32 (quoting Letter from Learned Hand to Felix
Frankfurter (Dec. 9, 1947)). Frankfurter wrote back, two days later:
It really is fantastic to assume that the kind of confused ethical judgments you
would get from Jerry's imagined panel of experts would be a dependable basis for
ajudicial judgment on such an issue.. . . Jerry too often is just a learned child-if,
indeed, learning is the product of a voracious appetite for reading without
considering the contents of books both backwards and forwards-backwards, by
placing them in the movement of ideas, and forwards, by viewing new ideas with
proper skepticism in determining their implications. Jerry too often reminds me
of Holmes in the reverse. You remember Holmes' remark: "I don't know facts; I
merely know their significance." Jerry knows a helluvah lot of books, but not
their significance.
Id. at 632 n.* (quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Learned Hand (Dec. 11, 1947)).
73. One might counter that Frank's treatment of the issue as one of factual proof
would put more authority in the hands of district court judges and thus open the way for
more diverse perspectives. But Frank does not suggest that a district judge's conclusion
would be insulated from review.
74. Indeed Hand himself made clear he did not like the "good moral character"
standard; he claimed only that his approach was the best he could do with that standard.
See Gunther, supra note 64, at 631-32.
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Court authority supports either the "ethical leaders" or the "fact-finding"

approach. And he offers the ethical leaders approach as preferable
though it was a more radical departure from his own court's approach,
and 1 would have guessed, not very likely to win Supreme Court
approval. 75
Just how appealing is this predictive model of how courts lower than
the highest relevant court should resolve legal issues? 76 We can distin-

guish between cases reasonably likely to get to the Supreme Court (or
other highest court) and those unlikely to do so. For those likely to reach
the highest court, the main problem is the kind of help the lower court
will give the reviewing court. Suppose judges on a lower court, in a case
in which they are not directly constrained by higher court precedents,
believe that the judges on the superior court will probably decide one
way, but they think a different way is more compelling. if they decide
based on an estimate of what the bigher court will do, they will have to
take into account not only the corpus of decisions of that court, but also
the political inclinations of recent appointees. In an extreme case, the

"correct" decision for a court of appeals could change between the time
of argument and the time of decision, if the President happens to appoint a conservative to replace a liberal on the Supreme Court. This feature might be eliminated if one said that all predictions should be based
only on the highest court's legal decisions; but even this modified predictive approach gives too little scope to the lower court. In correspondence

with Frank, Justice Frankfurter empbatically rejected Frank's conception
of the role of the lower court judge. He said, "This business of anticipating what this Court will do grossly misconceives the nature of the deliberative process here and improperly deprives this Court of the illumination
to which we are entitled when an issue is not foreclosed . . . ."77 If lower
court judges are virtually certain that the Supreme Court would take the
case and reverse the decision that the lower courtjudges think best, those
judges have a powerful reason not to force the party that will finally win
to continue the litigation to another level. However, when the highest
court's decision is uncertain, the judges below should decide as they
think best, giving due regard to authoritative precedents and to coherence with what the highest court has decided.

75. Frankfurter's ridicule of that approach in correspondence with Learned Hand is
suggestive in this regard. See supra note 72.
76. One strategy Frank commonly employed to express his views, while being faithful
to Supreme Court doctrine, was to vote according to the implications of Supreme Court
doctrine, but to urge that prevailing doctrine be overruled. One notable case in which he
employed this technique was United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 801 (2d Cir. 1956), affd,
354 U.S. 476 (1957), a famous obscenity case. See Glennon, supra note 23, at 111. Plainly,
Frank himself did not think lower court judges were engaged only in estimates of what
higher courts would do.
77. Glennon, supra note 23, at 112 (quoting Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Jerome
Frank (July 17, 1956)).
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For most cases decided by the federal courts of appeals, the judges
can be nearly sure that the Supreme Court will not grant review. In these
cases, judges should aim to develop a sensible body of law within a circuit
and among the courts of appeals of various circuits. It might be claimed
on behalf of Frank's approach that prediction of Supreme Court results
in these cases could best unify the circuits and would be fairest to litigants. But if the Supreme Court's view is itself uncertain, various estimates about it are not likely to lead judges on courts of appeals to agree.
And it is not apparent why it is fair to award decision to a party the judges
who are deciding the case-the effective final judges for that case-believe should lose, because these judges estimate uncertainly that judges
on a superior court would probably decide the other way if they ever took
the case, which they will not.
Cases the Supreme Court will not take raise sharply another problem: the relevant time of the decision to be predicted. Suppose judges
say to themselves: "It is inconceivable that the Supreme Court will take
this case, but we think most Justices, if they considered the issue now,
would decide against Party A. However, we think Party A should win, and
if we so decide, we think there is a good chance other circuits will follow
suit. Perhaps the Supreme Court will decide this legal issue in another
decade or so. At that point in time, given all we expect to happen, we
believe parties in the position of A will probably win if we decide in A's
favor." The whole idea of faithfulness to results under the present
Supreme Court is substantially undermined if that Court is highly unlikely to review a case.
When a lower court is not constrained by precedential authority or
by clear statements of legal rules, its role is not mainly to guess what the
highest court will do. The best way for it to build a sound body of law is
for it to decide according to its own views of the most apt legal decision.
2. The Most Subjectivist Implications of the Musical Analogy. - Recall
that Krenek suggested the desirability of different performers rendering
different interpretations of a score, each interpretation reflecting the personality of the performer. Frank does not quite endorse this feature of
the musical analogy as an aspect of statutory interpretation, but neither
does he explicitly disavow it. Even if judges inevitably reach decisions
that reflect their personalities, their attitude about how to decide should
differ from that of the sophisticated performer.
It is fine if Sir Thomas Beecham plays Mozart symphonies slowly and
Arturo Toscanini plays them quickly; if the New York Philharmonic plays
them on modern instruments and The English Concert plays them on
period instruments. No one suffers (much), and when people become
aware of various styles of playing, they can choose the performances they
wish to hear. Legal rules are different. Someone is coerced to behave in
a particular way because of the way a rule is construed. Further, the doctrine that courts announce serve as precedents for future cases. These
realities put judges in a position unlike that of musical performers.

2000 ]

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

193

Of course, judges can no more run away from their own essences
than can the performer, but what attitude should they bring to their task?
The performer, according to Krenek, can say to herself something like
this: "The composition leaves some room for individuating interpretation. I will give the best performance of which I am capable if I give voice
to my own individual sentiments within the bounds set by the composer."
The performer should not ask herself: "How would most other competent performers choose to perform this piece?"; or "What reasoned arguments can I make that my interpretation is more faithful to the original
composition than any other interpretation?" The performer might feel
that her interpretation is the best possible, but, if she has gasped Krenek's
message, she will understand that other interpretations are as valid as
hers and that the choice between them does not come down to reasoned
argument that favors one over the other. 78
When the judge faces the analogous questions, should she care how
other competent judges would be likely to interpret? Should she care
whether she has reasoned arguments in favor of her interpretation? The
traditional aspiration has been that judges decide on the basis of reasons
that have persuasive force for other judges. According to this aspiration,
a judge should not rest content with deciding according to her deeply
held intuitive feelings, as might the performer; the judge should test a
tentative answer against the perspectives of other judges and against the
power of competing arguments.
In respect to these genuinely difficult questions about judicial performance, Frank's lecture is markedly unclear. He offers us an arresting
and intriguing analogy that suggests that subjective individual reactions
by interpreters are desirable as well as inevitable, but he fails to comment
directly on the most subjectivistic implications of the musical analogy and
on whether they should guide the deliberations of the wise judge.
When we look at Frank's opinion in Repouille, we see that he did not
accept the most radical subjectivist implications of the musical analogy.
Both of Frank's recommended approaches carry forward the idea that
judges should follow community values and not impose their own. A
comparison with a different criticism of Hand's opinion is striking. The
legal philosopher Edmond Cahn challenged Hand's approach precisely
78. Of course, some interpretations may be "off the wall," and reasoned argument may
explain why those are not good. Musical performers who devote substantial study to the
origin of a work and its evolution in prior performances may consider interpretations
unacceptable that would not seem to be so for someone who read a musical score for the
first time. The critical point is not the breadth of the range of performances that are
"equally good," but that some significant range of this sort exists.
A reading of Levinson and Balkin, supra note 36, makes clear that many of those
involved in discussion of whether musical compositions of a former time should be played
on period or modern instruments do not have the casual, "let one hundred flowers
bloom," attitude that I take in the text. This is not the place to defend my belief that, with
the technology of modern recording, we are enriched by having both kinds of
performances.
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on the basis that it left too little scope for the judges' own convictions.79
Writing in the Columbia Law Review, Cahn objected to judges hiding behind community sentiments that were nearly impossible to discern and
might not be very enlightened. 80 Cahn wrote that judges should have the
courage to make moral decisions when the law calls for that.8 1 The
judges in Repouille should have applied the vague statutory term with their
"own moral principles"; a judge should exercise "such influence as he
[can] to raise the morals of the marketplace to a level approaching his
own."82 One might have imagined that Cahn had read Krenek and accepted some of the more radical aspects of the musical analogy. Even
Cahn did not suppose that various views about good moral character were
equally satisfactory (Krenek's idea about many performances), but he apparently hoped that if thoughtful judges decided for themselves what was
good moral character, the rich mixture of opinions could contribute to
increasing enlightenment about what acts are morally unjustifiable or
outrageous. In comparison with Cahn, the Frank of Repouille, who aims
to prevent judges making intuitive personal judgments, seems downright
conservative.
Frank, as ajudge, followed the practice of trying to adopt legal alternatives and present reasons that would have persuasive force for other
judges. In his lecture, he makes no argument that this aspiration in law is
misguided, however hard it may be to fulfill. An approach to law that
incorporates all elements of Krenek's recommendations about musical
performance is at odds with the idea of law and legal reason. No doubt,
some argument can be made for the vitality of a system in which judges
rest legal conclusions firmly on their own subjective personalities; but
since Frank neither advanced such an argument in his lecture nor adhered to such a practice as a judge, I need not respond to that possibility
here.
The respect in which Frank's dissent in Repouille does conform to his
lecture is in his creativity in achieving an approach that will best carry out
the spirit of the statute with which he deals. Frank says that his "ethical
leaders" approach is what Congress intended. To make the opinion of
ethical leaders controlling on how to apply a statutory standard would
have been a novel approach. The phrase "good moral character" was
initially to be applied by officials of the Immigration and Naturalization
79. See Edmond N. Cahn, Authority and Responsibility, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 838 (1951)
[hereinafter Cahn, Authority]; see also Edmond Cahn, The Moral Decision: Right and
Wrong in the Light of American Law 310 (1955) [hereinafter Cahn, Moral Decision]
("Judge Hand's approach attempts to return the task [of evaluating moral character] to
the community, and the attempt proves vain.... The act of individual judgment must
belong to him who bears the name of judge.").
80. See Cahn, Authority, supra note 79, at 846; see also Cahn, Moral Decision, supra
note 79, at 304.
81. See Cahn, Authority, supra note 79, at 851 ("What the community needs most
is ...
moral leadership .... ").
82. Id. at 844.
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Service; judges would get involved only on review. Presumably, each INS
officer was not to assemble a panel of ethical leaders. It seems unlikely
that any member of Congress actually considered this possibility for
courts and regarded it as prescribed by the statute. 83 if Frank is honest in
his comment about the intent of Congress, what he must mean is that this
approach best carries out the basic values lying behind the statute, not
that it carries out a specific understanding about how judges would determine "good moral character." That sense of the relation between legisla-

tures and courts corresponds with the lecture's recommendation that
judges should implement the fundamental objectives of statutes.
I shall save my main comments about judicial creativity until we have

examined the same issue in Justice Frankfurter's lecture. However, I
need here to examine a possible objection that Repouille is not fairly representative of Frank's overall approach, because "good moral character"
is obviously an open-ended standard, under which Congress delegates to
executive officials and judges the determination on subsequent occasions
of what falls under the standard. Perhaps Repouille may be a poor example of what Frank thinks about how judges should decide the scope of
legal rules that leave no evident room for such broad discretion.
A full answer to this objection would require an extended examina-

tion of Frank's statutory opinions. It is a partial answer, however, that the
objection somewhat misconceives the precise legal issue in Repouille and
that Frank's sense of creativity in accord with fundamental legislative purpose is also revealed in one of the two cases in which he and Justice
Frankfurter wrote and disagreed.
The issue that divided Frank from his colleagues was not whether

Repouille actually satisfied the statutory standard; it was how judges were
to decide that question. The standard of "good moral character" is itself
flexible and open-ended, embracing changes in application as values
change; but there is no reason to suppose that Congress intended the
method of deciding that question to be similarly flexible. Frank disagreed with his colleagues about method. Perhaps members of Congress
had no definite view about how courts should apply the standard, but that
determination-the issue that divided the judges in Repouille-is much
more like a typical decision about what rule to adopt than like the appli-

cation of a flexible legal standard.
Judge Frank similarly tried to satisfy underlying Congressional objectives in a copyright case in which he dissented, and saw the Supreme
Court affirm the decision of the majority in an opinion by Justice Frankfurter. 84 Copyright law provided an initial protection for twenty-eight
83. Nor does it seem likely that this is what one would predict the Supreme Court
would decide.
84. See M. Witmark & Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co., 125 F.2d 949, 954 (2d Cir. 1942)
(Frank, J., dissenting), aff'd, 318 U.S. 643 (1943). Frank's reasoning persuaded Justices
Black, Douglas, and Murphy, 318 U.S. at 659, the three Justices then generally most
sympathetic to the plight of the poor and oppressed.
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years and a renewal period for another twenty-eight years. If the author
was alive, he had the right to renewal; otherwise the right went to his
widow, children, executor, or next of kin. One of the composers of the
song "When Irish Eyes Are Smiling" had assigned both his original copyright and his renewal rights to that song (along with sixty-eight others)
for $1,600. When the time for renewal came, the composer applied for a
renewal and assigned his interest to another publisher.
The central issue was whether the original assignment of renewal
rights, made long before the renewal period, was valid. In general, people can assign their rights and interests to others. The controlling statute
did not mention assignment of renewal rights, but did not explicitly preclude it either. The precise legal analysis was complex, depending on the
relation of that statute to its predecessors and to earlier judicial decisions.
Some langnage in committee reports suggested that the reason for having a renewal period-rather than just a longer original copyright period-was to protect authors in their old age; 8 5 but the reports did not
clearly indicate that assignment was to be barred. 86 Both courts held the
original assignment was valid, finding insufficient indication that such assignments were not to be allowed.
Frank wrote an impassioned dissent. The aim of Congress, as evidenced by the reports, was to protect authors from their own bad judgment in selling their rights too soon, for too little money. He wrote, "We
need only take judicial notice of that which every schoolboy knows-that
usually, with a few notable exceptions ... authors are hopelessly inept in
business transactions and that lyricists . .. often sell their songs 'for a
song.''87 The point of a separate renewal period was to prevent authors
from selling all their rights in the first instance. Frank supported his
reading of the statutory language and history by relying on the constitutional basis for copyright: the encouragement of individual authors.
Against the court's reliance on broad legal policies that favored the alienation of rights, Frank responded in part with a long exegesis on limitations to principles of laissez-faire. 88
Although Frank here made an argument from the history of copyright law and the legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1909, his most
powerful claim is that if authors can assign their renewal rights long
before the renewal period, the existence of a renewal period will not afford authors and songwriters adequate protection. Frank's interpretation
focuses more on his sense of the statute's purpose than on either its precise language or the specific intent of the enacting Congress. As we shall
see, Justice Frankfurter thought Frank was reaching too far.

85. See Witmark & Sons, 125 F.2d at 955, 958.

86. See id. at 950.
87. Id. at 955.
88. See id. at 963.
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III. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER'S REFLECTIONS

The importance of Justice Frankfurter's lecture lies partly in its subtle view of the interpretive process, offered at a time when members of
the Court were not sharply divided over how judges should interpret statutes. 89 I summarize the themes of his lecture, draw from some of his
opinions, and then comment on his claims about the restrained freedom
of judges.
A. The Lecture
Frankfurter develops an approach to interpreting statutes when "between two readings, neither ... comes without respectable title deeds." 90
Although Frankfurter draws from the opinions of three great JusticesHolmes, Brandeis, and Cardozo 9 1-the views that he presents reflect his
own perspectives at least as much as theirs. 92
Frankfurter comments on the judge's task and the judicial function
before addressing more specific aspects of statutory interpretation. Most
of what he says can be classed under three themes. (1) Statutory interpretation is a complex art, neither reducible to literalism nor to judgments about the opinions of legislators. It demands a sensitive feel for
the purposes of legislation. (2) Judges, despite a realm of freedom in
legislative interpretation, do not legislate. (3) Text is very important in
statutory interpretation. In respect to his first theme, Frankfurter agrees
broadly with Frank. His remarks on the other themes diverge in letter or
spirit from Frank.
Having pointed out that the problem of interpreting meaning can
arise with any texts written in natural language, Frankfurter notes that
statutes, adopted by many legislators, are not "an expression of individual
thought to which is imparted the definiteness a single authorship can
89. Four years later in Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp., Justice Jackson
challenged what had become the standard use of legislative history. See 341 U.S. 384,
395-97 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Resort to legislative history is only justified
where the face of the Act is inescapably ambiguous, and then I think we should not go
beyond Committee reports . ... ").
90. Frankfurter, supra note 4, at 527-28.
91. According to Frankfurter, these Justices shared an essential similarity of attitude
and appraisal of the relevant. See id. at 531. The reader may perceive Frankfurter's
reference to the great Justices as an indication of his modesty. But Frankfurterrelied on a
similar technique in some of his annoying instructions to his fellow Justices. In a 1956
memorandum proposing changes in Court procedures, he wrote,
[e]ven before I came on the Court I had good reason to believe that the course of
proceeding leading to adjudication was not all that it might be. My grounds for
feeling that the deliberative process was inadequate derived from intimacies I had
enjoyed over the years with Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Cardozo.
Urofsky, supra note 13, at 60-61. The device of referring to the three greatJustices was not
only a way to acquire distance; it enlisted revered voices of the past behind views that
Frankfurter favored.
92. See Friendly, supra note 3, at 196.
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give." 93 At times, they are purposefully ambiguous or formulated with a
generality that allows decisions based on future circumstances. 9 4
In the closest he comes to any overall formula, Frankfurter comments (in a mouthful) "that the troublesome phase of construction is the
determination of the extent to which extraneous documentation and external circumstances may be allowed to infiltrate the text on the theory
that they were part of it, written in ink discernible to the judicial eye." 9 5
Treating statutory interpretation as an art, Frankfurter concludes from
the hundreds of cases in which the three Justices construed statues that
the "area of free judicial movement is considerable." 96 As Cardozo said,
the meaning must be sought in all the parts of a statute together and "in
their relation to the end in view." 9 7 Judges must attend to affiliated statutes and to the "temper of legislative opinion." 98 Frankfurter rejects the
English refusal to look to legislative history as barring material that is
logically relevant to meaning, understood in light of purpose.9 9 In accord with his general emphasis on context, Frankfurter writes, "in the

end, language and external aids, each accorded the authority deserved in
the circumstances, must be weighed in the balance of judicial
judgment." 0 0
Frankfurter accompanies his focus on statutory purpose and flexibility ofjudgment with remarks that emphasize the constraints under which
judges lie. The judge must exhibit "not only personal impartiality but
intellectual disinterestedness."'01 He must carry out formulated policies,
not choose capriciously or according to "private notions of policy." 102 Almost certainly referring to legal realists like Frank, Frankfurter says,
"There are not wanting those who deem naive the notion that judges are
expected to refrain from legislating in construing statutes."1 0 3 But, for
Frankfurter, the judicial function and competence are radically different
from those of the legislature.1 04
93. Frankfurter, supra note 4, at 528.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 529.
96. Id. at 533.
97. Id. at 538 (quoting Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 439 (1935)
(Cardozo, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
98. Id. at 539.
99. See id. at 541.
100. Id. at 544.
101. Id. at 529.
102. Id. at 532. Like Frank, Frankfurter quotes Bishop Hoadley about the power to
interpret, but cautions that "one does not subscribe to the notion that [interpreters] are
lawgivers in any but a very qualified sense." 1d. at 533.
103. Id. at 535. After quoting Holmes that "'the meaning of a sentence is to be felt
rather than proved,'" Frankfurter remarks, "[Holmes] would shudder at the thought that
by such a statement he was giving comfort to the school of visceral jurisprudence." Id. at
531-32 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 496 (1911)).
104. See id. at 534.
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if Frankfurter has any particular art in mind when he calls statutory
interpretation an art, it is apparently the art of translating. He compares
statutory words to "words in a foreign language." 105 Judges have a "duty
of restraint" as "merely the translator of another's command"; observance
of this duty "depends on self-conscious discipline." 10 6
Related to his theme of restraint is Frankfurter's attention to text.
Although he never suggests the exclusion of other criteria of meaning,
Frankfurter stresses the centrality of the statutory language. 107 The text is
the starting point of construction. 108 Judges "must not read in by way of
creation," and they "must not read out except to avoid patent nonsense
or internal contradiction." 109 Frankfurter's sense of the priority of text is
summed up well by his comment that when the legislature has expressed
a policy in a statute, judges must add or subtract "from the explicit terms
which the lawmakers use no more than is called for by the shorthand
nature of language." 110
Frankfurter briefly explains his avoidance of the term "legislative intent": "We are not concerned with anything subjective. We do not delve
into the minds of legislators or their draftsmen, or committee members." 111 Expressing reservations about Cardozo's suggestion that judges
aim to decide as Congress would have chosen, Frankfurter says:
thus to frame the question too often tempts inquiry into the subjective and might seem to warrant the court in giving answers
based on an unmanifested legislative state of mind. But the purpose which a court must effectuate is not that which Congress
should have enacted, or would have. It is that which it did enact, however inaptly, because it may fairly be said to be imbedded in the statute, even if a specific manifestation was not
105. Id. at 533.
106. Id. at 534.
107. Henry Friendly notes that Frankfurter's title is about the "reading" of statutes,
and that Frankfurter used to tell students to "(1) Read the statute; (2) read the statute; (3)
read the statute!" Friendly, supra note 3, at 201-02 (emphasis added).
108. Whether a text should be read with the minds of ordinary people or experts
depends on for whom a statute was written. See Frankfurter, supra note 4, at 536. "Words
of art bring their art with them," the coloring they have received throughout history. See
id. at 537. Because of the different roles of constitutions and statutes, "words in a
constitution may carry different meanings from the same words in a statute .... " Id.
109. Id. at 533. Judges should not rectify omissions in a statute, "whether careless or
calculated," even if "later wisdom . . . recommend[s] the inclusion." Id. at 534. Noting a
case in which Justice Holmes declared that an airplane is not "'a motor vehicle,'"
Frankfurter remarks, "we assume that Congress uses common words in their popular
meaning, as used in the common speech of men." Id. at 536 (quoting McBoyle v. United
States, 283 U.S. 25, 26 (1931)).

110. Id. at 535.
111. Id. at 539. He quotes Holmes, who, across a wide range of legal problems,
rejected the idea that subjective intent matters, for the proposition that "intention is a
residuary clause intended to gather up whatever other aids there may be to interpretation
beside the particular words and the dictionary." Id. at 538 (quoting unpublished letter
from Oliver Wendell Holmes) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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thought of, as is often the very reason for casting a statute in
very general terms.1 12
B. The Cases
Because Frankfurter recommends a delicate appraisal of a variety of
factors, his judicial opinions do not lend themselves easily to examination
of whether he has been faithful to his reflective expressions about statutory interpretation. 11 3 However, his opinions do provide a sense of how
he translates abstractions into concrete results in his own work.
One case that reveals his appraisal of relevant considerations is
Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp.114 The dispute involved the
scope of the Miller-Tydings Act exception to the Sherman Act prohibition on "contract[s] . . . or conspirac[ies], in restraint of trade."11 5 In
order to support prices during the Depression, many states adopted socalled "Fair Trade Acts," which allowed manufacturers to agree with retailers that the retailers would not sell products to consumers below an
agreed minimum price.11 6 The state acts also contained non-signer provisions; if a manufacturer contracted with some retailers, other nonsigning
retailers could not charge below the agreed price.11 7 For transactions
covered by the Sherman Act, the state laws violated federal antitrust law
in two ways: by allowing private agreements to fix prices and in forcing
nonsigners to go along. The Miller-Tydings Act provided that the Sherman Act would not render illegal "'contracts or agreements prescribing
minimum prices for . . . resale"' when these are lawful "under local
law."11 8 Justice Douglas wrote for the majority that the statutory language
validated only the actual agreements to set prices, not the coercive application of those prices to nonconsenting retailers.119
Justice Frankfurter dissented. He argued that the statutory text,
which legalized contracts forbidden by the Sherman Act, obviously made
legal the effects of those contracts under local law, including effects on
nonsigners.1 20 Frankfurter pointed out that states early recognized that
fair trade laws were ineffective without nonsigner provisions, and that
every state law had such a provision. 12 1 He proceeded to make a power112. Id. at 539.
113. We do know there is a substantial correlation between the ideas in the lecutre
and passages in some of Frankfurter's opinions because the lecture draws from opinions.
But that does not establish whether Frankfurter's actual bases of decision adequately
reflect the lecture's prescriptions. See Friendly, supra note 3, at 196.

114. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).

§

116. See Schwegmann Bros., 341 U.S. at 392.
117. See id.; see also id. at 398 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 386 (quoting Miller-Tydings Act, 50 Stat. 693 (1937) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
1 (1994)).
119. See id. at 388, 390.
120. See id. at 399.
121. See id. at 398.
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ful case that this understanding was clear in the crucial House Report and
in floor debate. 12 2 Given the backdrop of state fair trade laws and the
materials of legislative history, Frankfurter concluded that the "purpose"
of Congress was clearly indicated; it was the Court's responsibility to follow it.
In employing various criteria of interpretation and in emphasizing
Congressional purpose, Frankfurter's dissent in Schwegmann Brothers fits
his "Reflections." However, to this reader, his simplistic textual argument, that a law that validates price-fixing contracts evidently validates
the effects of those contracts on nonsigners, is strained. Justice Douglas's
reading of the face of the statutory language is much more natural. If
this judgment is correct, Frankfurter's view in Schwegmann Brothers is in
some tension with his lecture. A critic might say that Frankfurter is adding to the statutory words, that is, he is adding a consequence for nonsigning retailers that Congress failed to enact-a tactic he cautioned
against in his "Reflections." 1 23 A defender of the Justice's dissent might
respond that he just happens to read the language differently than I do,
or that the language itself must be understood in its historical context, 124
or that the ambiguity of the statutory language entitles Frankfurter to use
legislative history to resolve the amhiguity. Whatever one might finally
conclude about the text of the Miller-Tydings Act and Frankfurter's conclusion in Schwegmann Brothers, Henry Friendly demonstrates persuasively
that Frankfurter's emphasis on text in his opinions varied substantially. 125
He strongly attacked any "plain meaning" rule that foreclosed examination of legislative materials, and he occasionally reached results hard to
justify by the statutory text. 126
Frankfurter refers to purpose in Schwegmann Brothers, rather than
specific intent, but if one referred to the opinion one would be hard put
to say just what is the difference between these two in context. The most
straightforward distinction between purpose and specific intent is that
specific intent concerns the legislature's desired resolution of a particular
legal issue, whereas purpose involves broader or more ulterior objectives

122. See id. at 399. Frankfurter does not remark on the fact that few members of
Congress went out of their way to emphasize that by enlisting one willing retailer, a
manufacturer could coerce scores of unwilling retailers.
123. See Frankfurter, supra note 4, at 535.
124. More specifically, a reader aware of the history of fair trade acts would
understand the language to give effective protection of those acts by reaching nonsigners.
In this way, perceived purpose can affect how one reads language in the first place. This
argument about the language itself is not the one that Frankfurter makes.
125. See Friendly, supra note 3, at 202-06, 217-19.
126. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 94-95 (1959) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ("[If Congress chooses by appropriate means for expressing its purpose to use
language with an unlikely and even odd meaning, it is not for this Court to frustrate its
purpose. The Court's task is to construe not English but congressional English.").
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of legislation. 127 In his lecture, Frankfurter emphasizes a rather different
dichotomy, that between an inquiry into the subjective attitudes of legislators and an objective inquiry to discover purpose as an aspect of the statute. In a passage I have quoted above,1 28 Frankfurter goes well beyond a
position that any subjective attitudes must be consistent with the statute if
they are to help determine meaning; he claims that the inquiry into
meaning is not at all about subjective states of mind. Schwegmann Brothers
affords us an opportunity to explore this claim in greater depth.
We need initially to disjoin the distinction between specific and
broad from the distinction between subjective and objective. One might
conceive legislative purposes as the broad purposes actually entertained
by legislators rather than as somehow objectively embedded in the statute. And one might conceive of specific intent as an objective inquiry
into what relevant materials reveal about precise objectives.
One truth that Schwegmann Brothers reveals is that on some occasions
it is hard to differentiate narrow aim from broader purpose. I do not
mean only that in an ascending order from most specific to broadest
objectives, it is hard to draw the line where specific intent ends and purpose begins. I mean that on occasion what one treats as a broader purpose is virtually indistinguishable from the resolution of the more specific
issue. In his opinion, Frankfurter finds a purpose to validate nonsigner
aspects of fair trade laws-but that is indistinguishable from a specific
intent to validate the creation of a minimum price for nonsigners, the
precise issue in the case. Everything Frankfurter says in his opinion could
easily be subscribed to by a Justice who thought the overarching inquiry
should be about specific legislative objectives.1 29 Anyone who says it is
acceptable for judges to comb legislative history for purpose but not specific intent has a lot of explaining to do. Perhaps purpose should matter
more than narrower objectives if the two are in conflict, but given the
intertwining of purpose and specific intent in many instances, one cannot
plausibly contend that judges should consistently inquire about one and
never inquire about the other.
The distinction between objective and subjective is more elusive.
There are three important points. First, we may assume that Frankfurter
takes his opinion as establishing an objective purpose; but the very arguments he makes can comfortably be taken as showing that members of
Congress who thought about the problem conceived the act (subjectively) as validating the state nonsiguer clauses. Second, nowhere in his
lecture, or anywhere else as far as I know, doesJustice Frankfurter explain
how an objective purpose differs from a judgment about subjective atti127. Usually "purpose" is some broader objective, but it is possible to have an ulterior
ohjective that is no more general than one's direct objective. I oversimplify in the text in
assuming that a purpose is a broader objective.
128. See supra text accompanying note 111.
129. Indeed, Justices Black and Burton did join his opinion, and they could have
joined it with that understanding.
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tudes. It is reassuring to hear that judges are not plumbing the depths of
legislators' psyches, but what exactly are they doing in its stead? Third,
one can develop an objective account of purpose, or specific intent; but
doing so is not so simple and does not obviously evade all subjective in-

quiry. One might say, for example, that purpose is determined by the
conventional weight of legislative materials or by what a hypothetical "reasonable legislator" would take as a purpose. But these two candidates for
objective approaches may not successfully divorce themselves from appraisals of subjective attitudes. I explore this problem at length elsewhere, 130 but, briefly, the conventional weight of various sources reflects
what judges have considered to be very powerful evidence of the objectives of legislators who have been most involved with particular legislation; and one would expect the weight of sources to wax and wane, depending on their connection to the attitudes of legislators and their staff
members. How a reasonable legislator reacts to problems put before a
legislature will depend considerably on how most people in that position
would react. Under these objective approaches, the inquiry may no
longer be what a discrete number of actual legislators believed on a single
occasion; but neither approach provides answers about meaning that
somehow ascend from the subjective attitudes of real people.
Justice Frankfurter's willingness to read statutory language in light of
his overall evaluation of congressional policy was shown in one of the
cases in which he and Frank disagreed.131 The crucial question was the
method of calculating overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
The Act provided that no employee should work in excess of forty hours a
week unless receiving at least "one and one-half times the regnlar rate at
which he is employed." The double aim of the provision was to reduce
unemployment and the physical strain on workers by making it expensive
for employers to use workers overtime. The specific issue the judges addressed was "the regular rate" for longshoremen, who had irregular patterns of work. According to a collective bargaining agreement, longshoremen were paid straight time rates for work from 8:00 A.M. to 5:00
P.M. Monday through Friday and from 8:00 A.M. to noon on Saturday.
Work during other hours was paid as "overtime" (at about one and onehalf the straight time rate), whether or not the total hours of work exceeded forty. If we put aside some nuances, the "regular rate" could be
taken to be the straight time rate for work during ordinary hours or the
average hourly pay for hours a longshoreman worked during the week.
Under the latter approach, some "overtime" pay given for working off

130. See Kent Greenawalt, Are Mental States Relevant for Statutory and
Constitutional Interpretation?, 85 Cornell L. Rev. (forthcoming Sept. 2000).
131. See Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446, 477 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). The court of appeals decision is at 162 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1947).
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hours would figure in the "regular rate" against which overtime for working extra hours would be paid. 13 2
Drawing from Supreme Court precedents, Judge Frank had written
that the "regular rate" was an "actual fact," based on wages paid. So
called "overtime" paid for off-hours work should contribute to the regular
rate. The Supreme Court agreed. Noting that "it] he statute contains no
definition of regular rate of pay and no rule for its determination," 13 3 the
Court said "the purpose was to require judicial determination as to
whether in fact an employee receives the full statutory excess compensation . . . . [T]he most reasonable conclusion is that Congress intended"
the formula adopted by the court of appeals. 134
Justice Frankfurter dissented on the ground that the decision sapped
the principle of collective bargaining, a principle underlying the Fair Labor Standards Act. 135 According to Frankfurter, the majority treats the
statutory language as "parts of a cross-word puzzle." 136 For him, the test
should have been whether the collective agreement reflected the distinctive conditions of the industry. "Regular rate" in any industry "must be
interpreted in the light of the customs and practices of that industry." 137
By failing to establish an arithmetic rule, Congress left "regular rates" to
be agreed upon voluntarily by parties.13 8 Frankfurter criticizes the
Court's approach as unduly formalistic: producing untoward consequences that are said to be "compelled by a mere reading of what Congress has written." 139 In this instance, Frankfurter's approach is decidedly more policy-oriented than Frank's, trying to accommodate
Congress's larger purpose to promote collective bargaining and accepting a conclusion that the way to calculate "regular rate" could change
industry by industry. It does not follow that Frank is more of a formalist.
He was writing for his entire court and considered himself constrained by
Supreme Court authority; and his result actually helped the "little man"
132. The line-up of parties was interesting. The government represented the
employer, because the work had been done during the war, and the government was
footing the bill. The union agreed with the government that "straight time" represented
the regular rate; dissidents within the union wanted the higher amount. Why did the
union go along? Probably because it feared that it would get less attractive terms for offhours work if that was going to be part of "the regular rate" against which overtime would
be calculated. (Possibly union leaders were not primarily concerned with the welfare of
their workers.)
133. Bay Ridge Operating, 334 U.S. at 460.
134. Id. at 463-64.
135. See id. at 482. According to Friendly, supra note 3, at 219, Frankfurter's most
original contribution to the theory of statutory interpretation was the idea that each statute
must be read in terms of the policy of others. Although Frankfurter does not here refer to
other statutes, his sense of the importance of collective bargaining is undoubtedly based on
many legislative efforts.

136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 478.
Id. at 482-83.
See id. at 486.
Id. at 484.
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at odds with the "establisbment" of employers and union-an outcome
that may well bave appealed to his own sensibilities.
In the copyright case involving the assignment of renewal rights,
Frankfurter concluded that Frank had ranged too far beyond the language and evident purpose of the Copyright Act, in asserting that authors
could not assign renewal rights prior to the renewal period.1 40 For the
five Justices in the majority, Justice Frankfurter began with the Act, emphasizing that its explicit words did not limit assignability of the author's
renewal interest.141 After surveying the relevant history of copyright law
and the language of the committee report on whicb Frank mainly relied,
Frankfurter wrote, "The report cannot be tortured, by reading it without
regard to the circumstances in which it was written, into an expression of
a legislative purpose to nullify agreements by authors to assign their renewal interests."1 4 2 Frankfurter was yet more caustic about Frank's "judicial notice" of the nature of authors:
We are asked to recoguize that authors are congenitally irresponsible .. .. We do not have such assured knowledge about
authorship, and particularly about song writing, or the psychology of gifted writers and composers, as to justify us as judges in
importing into Congressional legislation a denial to authors of
the freedom to dispense of their property possessed by
others.1 43
In this case, Frankfurter, like Frank, interprets the statutory language in
light of broad policies. For Frankfurter, the guiding policy is one that
individuals can assign their legal rights wben they choose. It would take a
clear indication by a legislature that it means to contravene that policy;
neither the 1909 statute nor the relevant committee reports did that.
Frankfurter's confidence in judicial detachment is perhaps nowhere
better displayed than in a remarkable opinion applying the due process
clause. During most of Frankfurter's quarter century on the Supreme
Court, Justices debated the constitutionality and wisdom of a flexible approach to due process, under which practices were unconstitutional if
they violated the standards of fundamental decency of English-speaking
peoples.1 44 As an aspect of his claim that the Bill of Rights applied in full
force against the states, Justice Black, in 1947, complained that the prevailing flexible due process formula gave judges "boundless power under
'natural law' periodically to expand and contract constitutional standards
140.
141.
142.
143.

See Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1943).
See id. at 647.
Id. at 655.
Id. at 656-57.

144. The exact formulation of the standard varied; a version that paid less attention to
the cultures of English-speaking peoples was whether a claimed right was "implicit in a
concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled by

Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
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to conform to the Court's conception of what at a particular time constitutes 'civilized decency' and 'fundamental liberty and justice.' "145
In a concurrence in that case, and in a succession of subsequent
cases, Frankfurter defended the view thatjudges could be trusted to make
disinterested decisions under the due process formula. 146 Frankfurter
wrote for a majority in a case holding that the state could not use evi-

dence of narcotics obtained by forcibly pumping the defendant's stomach and making him vomit. 147

He wrote:

[T] here is from our decisions no immediate appeal short of impeachment or constitutional amendment. But that does not
make due process of law a matter of judicial caprice. The faculties of the Due Process Clause may be indefinite and vague, but
the mode of their ascertainment is not self-willed. In each case
"due process of law" requires an evaluation based on a disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science, on a balanced order of facts exactly and fairly stated, on the detached consideration of conflicting claims, on ajudgment not ad hoc and episodic
but duly mindful of reconciling the needs both of continuity
and of change in a progressive society.
Applying these general considerations to the circumstances
of the present case, we are compelled to conclude that the proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than
offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism
about combatting crime too energetically. This is conduct that
shocks the conscience. . . . [T]his course of proceeding by
agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to offend
even hardened sensibilities. They are methods too close to the
rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation. 148
The first of these strikingly juxtaposed paragraphs holds out substantial hope of restraint, but what exactly is the restraint on individual judgment? Frankfurter is confident that judges can apply the "shock the con145. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 69 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting), overruled
in relevant part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). The issue was a prosecutor's
comment on a defendant's failure to take the stand, a violation of the privilege against self
incrimination under interpretations of the Fifth Amendment. The majority said that due
process did not preclude such comment on a defendant's silence. See id. at 58.
146. See id. at 68 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that "[t]he fact that judges
among themselves may differ whether in a particular case a trial offends acceptable notions
of justice is not disproof that general rather than idiosyncratic standards are applied"); see
also, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.) ("The real clue to the
problem confronting the judiciary in the application of the Due Process Clause is not to
ask where the line is once and for all to be drawn but to recognize that it is for the Court to
draw it by the gradual and empiric process of 'inclusion and exclusion.'" (quoting
Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877).
147. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), overruled on other grounds by
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). At this stage the "exclusionary rule" had not been
applied to most illegal state searches, yet the Court held that in this instance the state
could not use the evidence.
148. Id. at 172 (citation omitted).
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science" test disinterestedly, but all his rhetoric about the "spirit of
science" and "detached consideration" does not provide much of a guide
about how judges can rise above their own personal evaluations. 149
A critic might doubt the aptness of this example for our topic. After
all, it involves constitutional, not statutory, interpretation, and its legal
issue is unusual. However, Frankfurter's belief that judges can attain disinterestedness is not limited to constitutional cases. The passage I have
quoted is fairly representative of his overall view. Indeed, Frankfurter
here expresses his confidence in circumstances in which it is most difficult to suppose thatjudges can rise above personal reactions. The question whether conduct "shocks the conscience" resembles the inquiry
about "moral outrage" in Repouille.' 5 0 With his Freudian views aboutjudicial behavior, Frank had little doubt that judicial personalities play a significant part in such evaluations. His response was to suggest methods
that would minimize their effect. Frankfurter sees less need to curb
judges in this way, because he trusts their ability to act wisely and
disinterestedly.
Someone might respond that disinterestedness may be unattainable
in the settings of Rochin and Repouille, but is attainable in respect to more
mundane legal issues. That, of course, is possible. But if Frankfurter's
view seems startlingly unrealistic for the circumstances he addresses, that
at least sows seeds of doubt about its accuracy for cases in which it is
much harder to say whether personal reaction or detached legal analysis
is doing the work of decision.
IV.

CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE

Has the legal community passed beyond these lectures from a half
century ago, or do they have something to say to us today? Certainly the
questions they address have not faded away. The central issues about statutory interpretation, such as the importance of text, the place of purpose,
and the constraints on judges, continue over time. Formulations and perspectives shift, but these are not the sorts of issues that will ever be decisively resolved once and for all. Certainly, also, the views ofJustice Frankfurter, and to a lesser extent Judge Frank, continue to influence sitting
judges. Many present judges were taught by students of Justice Frankfurter whose theory of statutory interpretation largely coincided with his.
"Legal process" thinking is not as dominant as it once was, but it has had
a substantial influence on how leading members of the profession conceive of statutory interpretation. The typical arguments put forward by
many of the Supreme Court's present Justices could easily flow from the
149. In a perceptive article, Sanford Kadish suggested criteria thatjudges might use to
apply the flexible due process formula in many cases. See Sanford H. Kadish,
Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 Yale

L.J. 319, 344-58 (1957).
150. See supra Part

II.B.
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pen of Justice Frankfurter, though no one has embraced his distinctive
style of writing.
Evaluating how the lectures of Frankfurter and Frank stand as possible bases for a modern theory of statutory interpretation is a bit more
difficult. My own view is that with some appropriate picking and choosing from elements in the lectures, and with some additional elaboration
on the vital subject of how far courts should defer to administrative judgments, one can build an approach that remains plausible and defensible,
and is probably preferable to each of its two main competitors.
For this exercise, I count both Frank and Frankfurter as adopting
purposive approaches that give some respect to the text. One main competitor is textualism, which gives overriding significance to a natural reading of the text. 15 1 As the other main competitor, I include recommendations to judges to rely heavily on their own moral appraisals or to make
pragmatic forward-looking judgments when they interpret statutes.1 52
This conclusion is not the occasion for a detailed evaluation of these
issues, but 1 sketch what such an evaluation might look like. 1 remind the
reader of the major points on which Frank and Frankfurter agree and
disagree: In some respects the antidote for the excesses of one is found
in the views of the other. I suggest vulnerabilities of a purposive approach that have led to its challenge. I then ask whether the main competitors have even greater weaknesses, and whether one may reasonably
adopt a chastened, more refined version of a purposive approach.
On certain basic themes, Frankfurter and Frank agree. Judges are
constrained by the language a legislature has chosen, and by the purposes
that lie behind the language, but the art of statutory interpretation is far
from mechanical and involves much more than stringing words together
according to their dictionary meanings. The art is one that cannot be
captured in formulas; it must be exhibited and observed in context. 153
Frankfurter stresses the priority of text more than Frank. Frank
writes about legislative intent as if it rests on mental states legislators had;
Frankfurter rejects talk of legislative intent and of judges relying on the
subjective attitudes of legislators. The most important differences are in
151. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law
23-25 (1997); Frank Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 545-51

(1983).
152. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 313-54 (1986); Richard Posner, The
Problems of Jurisprudence 73-100 (1990).
153. Frankfurter makes more of an effort than Frank to exhibit instances in which
able judges have interpreted statutes well, but his account of opinions by Holmes,
Brandeis, and Cardozo does not give enough of the facts and the competing arguments for
the reader to grasp what is especially skillful in what the judges do and say. Better in this
respect is Gunther's book about Learned Hand, which does provide enough detail to give
one a sense of how Hand, greatly admired by both Frank and Frankfurter, interprets
statutes. See Gunther, supra note 64, at 466-73. Friendly provides an illuminating picture
of Frankfurter's own statutory work. See generally Friendly, supra note 3.
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the subtle question of the degree of constraint under which judges lie
and in the capacity of judges to be disinterested.
Matters of degree are hard to pin down, but Frankfurter implies that
judges are under more constraint than Frank believes. Both authors say
statutory interpretation is an art, but Frankfurter's chosen art is translation; Frank's is musical performance, understood in a way that emphasizes the performer's creativity. Frankfurter talks of limited freedom, but
not creativity. Frank argues that judges do legislate and that it would be
better if they were candid about this. Frankfurter emphasizes the difference between judicial and legislative functions; he says judges are lawgivers only in "a very qualified sense," 15 4 and he later talks about judicial
expansion of meaning "which properly deserves the stigma of judicial legislation." 155 Frank tantalizes the reader with the suhjectivist implications
of his musical analogy, but he never endorses the idea that judges should
self-consciously indulge their own inclinations to the degree that is
proper for musical performers. One cannot imagine Frankfurter employing the analogy or raising sucb an idea in the minds of readers. His two
barbed remarks aimed at legal realists are a lucid sign that he believes
authors like Frank have gone too far in that direction.
Closely related is the subject of disinterestedness. Frank has no
doubt that judicial personalities will play a significant role. Frankfurter is
much more hopeful about the degree of detachment judges can achieve.
If one were trying to build a defensible modern view out of Frank
and Frankfurter, one would disavow the most subjectivist aspects of
Frank's analogy to musical performance. Judges interpreting statutes
must strive for reasons they believe do (or should) have persuasive force
for other judges. They cannot allow themselves to resolve cases solely on
the basis of some "authentic" personal reaction to the statutory materials.
That is to say, interpersonal reasons carry more force in statutory interpretation than in musical performance (if Krenek is right about the
latter).156
One would need to find a middle ground between Frank's excessive
emphasis on the judicial personality and Frankfurter's faith in judicial
detachment. At least in their determinations of law, judges often agree,
154. Frankfurter, supra note 4, at 533.
155. Id. at 540.
156. An arresting modern analogy is the strike zone in major league baseball. Various
umpires have developed personal strike zones that vary considerably, and league officials
want greater uniformity. I assume that if an umpire defends calling a strike zone that
varies from the rulebook strike zone, he does so in terms of what makes the game better,
given shared ideas about the value of the game, not just what makes the game most
appealing to him.
Levinson and Balkin point out that the analogy may be helpful for a detached view of
what transpires within a discipline, even if the analogy is not helpful within the discipline
about how to resolve problems. See Levinson & Balkin, supra note 36, at 1655 n.232. Like
Frank, I am concentrating on the musical analogy as it bears on the judicial task, not on
whether it illuminates the work of judges as seen from the outside.
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and they agree because of a shared sense within the legal community
about the strength of arguments. But no one who thinks carefully can
doubt that social class, race, gender, national origin, sexual preference,
and more personal factors affect judicial outlooks. This idea has been a
mainstay of critical theorists of various stripes during the last two decades.
When cases are difficult, when good arguments can be made on both
sides, the idea that detachment will somehow get judges to the right result seems naive. The mix of the personal is inevitably greater than
Frankfurter acknowledged. Justice Frankfurter's opinions do not convey
the sense that he willfully injected his personal views more than his judicial philosophy allowed; but one cannot resist the sense that the personal
had a larger part than he recoguized. 157
Frankfurter's lecture emphasizes statutory text to a greater degree
than does Frank, but his own judging indicates how crucial is a statute's
historical and legal context. Any defensible theory of interpretation must
respect the text, though we should recognize that no abstract formulation
is likely to be very helpful about how far judges should rely on other criteria to adopt a reading that is less natural on its face than a competing
interpretation. 158 What both Frankfurter and Frank clearly reject is any
view that makes a parsing of the text with dictionary in hand the decisive
inquiry in most cases.
Frankfurter and Frank agree that judges should take their policies
from Congress, and they should aim to carry out those policies consistent
with the statutory language. 15 9 Frankfurter's lecture emphasizes legislative purposes over specific intent about outcomes. Frank does not focus
on tbis dichotomy, and his copyright opinion makes a specific intent argument from a committee report-namely that the focused aim was not
to allow authors to make early assignments of renewal rights. 160 But
157. For example, despite his general philosophy of restraint, Frankfurter was quite
ready to overturn what he deemed to be establishments of religion and illegal searches.
See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 260-62 (1960) (Frankfurter, J.) (search and
seizure); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212-13, 215-17 (1948) (Frankfurter,
J., writing separate opinion) (establishment). There was no evident reason in his views
about the judicial role why review in these domains should be more active than review in
free speech and free press cases, where Frankfurter typically exercised greater restraint.
See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525-26 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); see also, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 261, 266-67 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J.); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 281-85 (1941) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
158. Friendly is instructive on this point. See Friendly, supra note 3, at 212-19.
159. Frank's exposition of the predictive responsibilities of the lower court judge
should be rejected. Both Repouille and the copyright case cast strong doubt on whether
Frank as a judge really sought always to reach the result he thought the sitting, or a future,
Supreme Court would be likely to reach. He regarded himself as constrained by
precedent, but within those constraints, he appeared to aim for what he regarded as the

best result. In any event, whatever Frank believed and practiced, lower courts, within the
boundaries of what the Supreme Court has decided, should aim for the best resolutions
they can, not try to guess what a majority of Justices will decide.
160. See supra text accompanying note 87.
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Frank's Repouille opinion and much of the rest of his copyright opinion

indicate that Frank was prepared to draw upon legislative purposes to
develop judicial resolutions that had not been specifically in the minds of
members of the legislature. (Almost certainly, members of Congress did
not assume that courts would call ethical leaders to elaborate what was
"good moral character.")
I have already suggested that, insofar as the distinction between purpose and specific intent is one between general or broad objectives and
the envisioned resolution of specific legal issues, one cannot reasonably
say that judges should look at legislative materials to discern purposes but
not specific outcomes. Purpose and specific resolutions are often tangled
together, as in Schwegmann Brothers, and judges lack any solid reason to
avert their eyes about specific resolutions if they are to pay attention to
broad purposes.1 61 There is room for difference of judgment about how
seriously judges should take isolated statements about specific resolutions, about how purpose and specific intent should be regarded when
the two seem to conflict, and about whether the significance of specific
intent should diminish as time passes from a statute's adoption. A full
theory must come to grips with these subtle problems. There is also a
crucial question about how far judges should draw purposes from the
entire corpus of legislation, rather than specific statutes. On behalf of
judges doing so is the idea that the law as a whole should be rational and
coherent; against such an approach is the claim that each Congress is
unique, and its writ should run only in respect to subjects it has actually
legislated.
Frankfurter's blithe assumption that his inquiry into purpose is objective and does not involve assessment of legislators' states of mind deserves either rejection or development. A modern theory of purposive
interpretation needs to explain just how and to what degree assessments
of purpose rest on assumptions about attitudes of legislators or of people
who might be legislators.
A final point about purposive interpretation ties closely to what I
have said about detachment and personal factors. Modern scholars are
more skeptical about the objectivity of purposive approaches than were
either of our judges. One concern is that when interpreters give great
weight to broad legislative purposes, they fail to give due regard to the
compromises that make up so much of the legislative process.1 62 The
more pervasive concern is that reasonable judges can disagree about purposes and about how they may be effectuated. Judges giving weight to
purposes may implement their own notions of good policy, while attribut161. In one of the most powerful defenses of use of legislative history, Stephen Breyer
writes of it as an aid to discerning legislative purpose, See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of

Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65

S. Cal. L. Rev. 845 (1992). In each of his

five major case illustrations, what the judges discerned could easily be called a specific
intent. See id. at 848-61.
162. See Easterbrook, supra note 151, at 540-44.
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ing them to the legislature. In sum, telling judges that they must adhere
to the legislature's purposes, not their own private notions of policy, is
less of a restraint than either Frank or Frankfurter seemed to believe. In
the few cases at which we have looked, self-conscious legislative compromise does not loom as central, although the statutory formula of "regular
rate" and the omission of language about assigument of renewal rights in
the copyright statute could have been the products of disagreements over
more specific statutory language. The influence of personal ideas of policy seems evident to me in Frank's Repouille and copyright opinions, and
in Frankfurter's strong emphasis on collective bargaining as the basis for
determining a "regular rate."163
The specific problem of compromise is whether judges should seek
to give effect to various compromises or seek to impart more rational
purposes to unclear provisions. Richard Posner once proposed that
judges should decide in accord with how the legislature would have resolved a problem. He used the analogy of a subordinate who had not
clearly received the command of a military superior. 16 4 This "military
command" approach, which resembled language of Cardozo's against
which Frankfurter cautioned, 165 allows judges to work imaginatively with
specific statutory language, but it is faithful to compromises. It does not
encourage judges to assume that the legislature is rationally purposing
rational purposes. 166 A competing approach is Jonathan Macey's suggestion that when statutory language is unclear, judges do best to interpret it
to achieve stated public-regarding purposes, not partially concealed private interests. 16 7 Because it will build a better law and encourage legislators to act responsibly, 1 prefer this approach to one that asks judges to
discern compromises that are not clearly carried out by a statute's terms.
The concern that a focus on purpose is not as much of a restraint as
Frankfurter and, to a lesser extent, Frank suggest is more intractable.
163. I do not doubt that a strong policy in favor of collective bargaining existed. But I
do doubt that it should have won out against a policy of establishing a settled procedure
for determining "regular rates" that would best protect workers and discourage overtime
work.
164. See Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes
and the Constitution, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 179, 189 (1986-87).
165. See supra text accompanying note 112.
166. This presumption of rationality is found in a famous passage of Hart and Sacks.
See Hart & Sacks, supra note 7, at 1125 ("The statute ought always to be presumed to be
the work of reasonable men pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably ... ."). In context, it
is clear that the presumption is not a descriptive generalization but a premise for sound
judicial decision-making.
167. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through
Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 223, 227, 250-56
(1986). Einer Elhauge has argued that we have no standard for distinguishing public
interests from private interests. See Einer EIhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify
More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 Yale L.J. 31, 57-59 (1991). So long as judges adhere
to stated purposes, this criticism, even if accurate, is not a decisive objection to Macey's
proposal.
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One can say that purpose is something of a constraint. Most judges are
conscientious. Most judges do not deliberately seek to manipulate notions of legislative purpose to cover their reliance on personal notions of
policy. And judges who try to be faithful to legislative objectives do often
resort to premises other than their own preferred notions of policy. This
is hardly a full guarantee against the influence of the personal, but no
such guarantee is possible.
A reasonable appraisal of any approach must assess its virtues against
those of its competitors. What of influential views that differ significantly
from those of our two judges?
One response to the concern that judges inevitably implement their
own ideas of justice and public welfare has been to embrace that tech-.
nique of decision explicitly. Ronald Dworkin has recommended that
judges read statutes and constitutional provisions in light of their own
moral assessments.1 68 Richard Posner, though rejecting the place of such
moral reasoning in legal decisions,1 69 now tells judges to be pragmaticto decide self-consciously in terms of social desirability.1 70 William Eskridge and other evolutionists claim that as statutes age, judges should
decide in ways that reflect modern assessments of value as well as the
legislature's original purposes.171
Under these approaches, judges should candidly face and accept
their responsibility to make crucial evaluations when they decide difficult
cases. Still, these approaches differ from the most subjectivist implications of the musical analogy. Judges should make determinations and
arguments that they believe should have persuasive power for other
judges, but without supposing that reference to legislative purpose and
surrounding legal materials will provide a great deal of restraint.
The approach of Justice Antonin Scalia,1 72 and other New Textualists,173 is substantially different. For them, constraint is paramount, but
constraint cannot be found in the vagaries of broad purpose. Judges
should not try to cooperate freely with the legislature in achieving its
broad objectives; they should accept the language the legislature has
adopted, and let legislators correct their own mistakes.
Those modern writers who suggest that judges explicitly give weight
to modern evaluation-including, to a degree, their own-are correct
that candid judges cannot hide completely behind the purposes of legis168. See especially Dworkin, supra note 152, at 313-99. This is only one aspect of
Dworkin's full theory. He also emphasizes that judges should decide in accord with
coherence with existing law, and should give conventional weight to sources of legislative
history.
169. See Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 Harv.
L. Rev. 1637, 1693-1709 (1998).
170. See Richard A. Posner, Legislation and its Interpretation: A Primer, 68 Neb. L.
Rev. 431, 449-50 (1989).
171. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (1994).
172. See Scalia, supra note 151.
173. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 151.
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latures and the values of "the law." Frankfurter, especially, makes it
sound too easy for judges to forego personal notions of policy. But both
our judges rightly understood that, in the main, judges should take legislative objectives as their guide in statutory interpretation and that judges
are usually capable of distinguishing objectives reflected in legislation
from objectives they would adopt as legislators. No one really doubts that
evident purposes should assist judges in discerning statutory meaning.
Rather, the real issues are how much an assessment of purpose should
count against a judge's sense of the natural reading of the language and
against his or her own evaluation of justice or of a desirable legal rule for
the future. The question of judicial evaluation cannot be wished away by
saying judges should rely on legislative purposes, rather than their own.
Judges should, on occasion, make evaluations ofjustice and welfare even
if these cannot be fairly cast as carrying out the legislature's objectives.
But Frank and Frankfurter are right that the usual approach should be to
seek legislative purpose and be guided by it. In comparison with any approach that suggests that judges should typically resolve difficult cases on
the basis of their own moral appraisals or sense of desirable policy, the
"purpose approach" better respects the proper competence of the legislature and offers a healthy, if incomplete, restraint on judicial discretion.
Turning to the New Textualism, the idea that the "natural" reading
of language constrains judges much more than attention to purpose is
itself illusory.1 4 The faithful pursuit of "natural" meaning creates unnecessary tension between legislatures and courts, as judges keep finding that
legislatures have not implemented their purposes with sufficiently explicit language.
When one surveys the field of modern competitors, the major claims
that Frank and Frankfurter share remain defensible starting points for an
approach to statutory interpretation that respects the variant roles of legislators and judges and constrains judges more appropriately than do the
alternatives.

174. See A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in
Statutory Interpration, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 71, 73-78 (1994).

